Agenda item

This report continues the cycle of regular updates that the Emergency Planning team provide for the Audit and Standards Advisory Committee. The report provides the Committee with an update on the work and priorities of the team since the last update in July 2025.

Darren Armstrong (Deputy Director, Organisational Assurance and Resilience) introduced the report on behalf of Melissa Brackley (Deputy Head of Resilience), who sent her apologies owing to annual leave. In presenting the report, the following key points were highlighted:

·            The report provided assurance over the Council's emergency planning and resilience framework, governance arrangements and processes, reflecting the Council's responsibilities as a Category 1 responder under the Civil Contingencies Act.

·            Emergency planning was explained to not be a static discipline; the Council's approach focused on continuous improvement, learning from incidents and exercises, reflecting national best practice, and aligning with the Resilience Standards for London.

·            An independent review of the Council's emergency planning arrangements commissioned around two years previously continued to inform an ongoing improvement programme, alongside an action plan developed in response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report.

·            The Emergency Planning and Resilience team was relatively small, providing coordination, advice, challenge and support across the organisation, with effective resilience recognised as a shared, whole-council responsibility.

Having thanked Darren Armstrong for the report, the Chair invited questions and comments, with the following issues raised:

·            Members began the discussion by raising four points: first, whether the Community Resilience Hub referenced at paragraph 3.5.5 (in relation to work with CVS Brent) had been commissioned by the Council or was CVS Brent's own initiative, and whether there was a timeline; officers advised they were not certain of the background and would confirm this following the meeting. Second, in light of a recent terrorist incident in a park in Germany, whether the Council's planning for events in parks would be reviewed; officers confirmed that, following the national threat level rising from substantial to severe in April, a number of actions had been progressed, that significant event-day planning work had already taken place in relation to Wembley (including a recent exercise with the stadium and partners), and that officers would come back to the Committee specifically on parks. Third, whether work with key partners on the climate change/heatwave exercise involved registered housing providers; officers confirmed this was not currently the case, that Council arrangements were primarily focused on council-related properties, and that these issues were discussed with registered providers via the Borough Resilience Forum. Fourth, on lithium-ion battery risk (paragraph 3.9.10), whether there was a timeline for the waste management work with Veolia, and whether the issue could be raised at the Resilience Forum regarding public communications on safe e-bike/battery charging; officers confirmed this had been discussed internally and with the London Fire Brigade, and was also being considered at the West London Resilience Board, and that a further update would be included in the Strategic Risk Report to the next Committee meeting.

·            Moving on, it was enquired as to what was considered a ‘prolonged event’ and how the Council was resourced to respond. Officers explained that many calls could be resolved through signposting to the relevant council service without the Emergency Planning team standing up a dedicated response, whereas prolonged events required arrangements such as rest centres, temporary accommodation and financial support; resources available included the dedicated team, a pool of trained Local Authority Liaison Officers, logisticians and other specialist roles, wider officer training across the Council, and mutual aid arrangements with other local authorities.

·            Following this, three further points were raised. First, when every council service would have an up-to-date business continuity plan; officers confirmed all services should have a plan reviewed annually, that most had recently been refreshed with outstanding ones due for completion over the summer, and that outcomes would be consolidated and cross-referenced with IT disaster recovery arrangements in a report in September; officers confirmed that Internal Audit's review of business continuity was being conducted independently, with the Emergency Planning team working closely alongside Internal Audit using its access across the organisation. Second, whether officers were satisfied that critical systems could be recovered within agreed recovery times in the event of a major cyber incident; Darren Armstrong advised this could not yet be assured pending completion of the business continuity refresh, and Minesh Patel (Corporate Director, Finance and Resources) added that no council could give complete assurance on cyber resilience, but that Brent was learning from incidents at other authorities (citing Westminster and Kensington & Chelsea) and that testing resilience was the best available mitigation. Third, given the significance of the Civic Centre, when the hostile reconnaissance/vulnerability plan would be completed and tested (in the context of ‘Martyn's Law’); officers confirmed this work was being undertaken with police colleagues and was in progress, but that no specific completion date was being published in order to maximise the benefit of the exercise, with assurance to be provided to the Committee once complete.

·            Committee members requested an update on progress in implementing actions arising from the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 report, and about the current stage of cladding remediation work visible across social and private housing in Brent. Officers clarified that the Emergency Planning team's actions related specifically to making the Council's response and recovery arrangements more resident-focused (including appropriate financial assistance arrangements), rather than to cladding remediation itself, which sat with housing colleagues.

·            A query referencing (page 38, paragraph 3.9 area) a new requirement for senior management roles in relation to long-term sustainability of emergency planning arrangements, asking whether this implied a time limit for completing training or an expectation of prior EPR knowledge before appointment. Officers confirmed there was no expectation of prior knowledge; the intention was to ensure the gold/silver/Halo command rota was well resourced, with officers trained (via gold, silver and Halo command training) before being onboarded to the rota, matched to roles suited to their background.

·            Two points on business continuity and cyber resilience were raised, referring to the statement at paragraph 3.9.11 that services might need to operate under significantly constrained arrangements for prolonged periods with substantial backlogs; and asked whether the LGA supported the Council on this issue given the sector-wide risk. Officers confirmed resilience was being promoted, with ongoing work to improve business continuity planning templates and desktop exercises. The team was working closely with Internal Audit, whose 2025-26 plan included a business continuity theme reviewing services such as adult and children's social care; support and shared learning was also accessed via the London Resilience Forum, reporting through London Councils. Members then responded, asking whether AI presented a resilience risk; officers confirmed AI was captured as a strategic risk (subject to a previous deep-dive to the Committee) but was not currently a leading risk from a purely emergency planning/business continuity perspective, though officers agreed to reflect further. Finally, questions were raised on whether Martyn's Law was yet in force; officers confirmed it would come into force in early 2027, with an independent internal audit report on the Council's preparedness due to the Committee in December 2026.

·            Regarding audit targets, members enquired why only 79% of internal audit recommendations had been completed within timescale, and what single resilience risk kept officers on edge; Darren Armstrong advised that, for him personally, this was retaining the skilled Emergency Planning team, alongside a Grenfell-type or major cyber incident given their potential to affect all council operations.

·            Observations were made regarding the point at (paragraph 3.9.11) on the joint IT Committee comprising Brent, Lewisham and Southwark, which had dedicated cyber security resources, the Council's Data Ethics Board, and considered AI-related risks when new software was introduced.

The Chair thanked Darren Armstrong and the Emergency Planning and Resilience team for their work in keeping Brent's residents safe, and it was RESOLVED to note the report, with the Committee's thanks formally placed on record. It was noted that Darren Armstrong would report back to the Committee on the question of counter-terrorism planning for park-based events.